Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.
Introduction
One way to reduce the negative consequences of climate change is to adapt to new circumstances. Adaptation played an important role in the early policy discussions on climate change, but adaptation as a policy option was later fiercely opposed and the focus of climate policy shifted almost exclusively to curbing greenhouse gas emissions (Pielke et al. 2007 ).
Taking adaptation into account was discredited as a "kind of laziness, an arrogant faith in our ability to react in time to save our skins" according to Al Gore (1992, p. 240) . Only recently, economists began to also focus on the role of adaptation, and adaptation now ranks much higher on the political agenda (see, e.g., OECD 2008 , 2012 , IPCC 2007 . In the latest report of the IPCC Working Group II, adaptation to climate change is described as "the process of adjustment to actual or expected climate and its effects. In human systems, adaptation seeks to moderate or avoid harm or exploit beneficial opportunities. In some natural systems, human intervention may facilitate adjustment to expected climate and its effects." (IPCC 2014, p. 5 ).
According to the Stern Review (Stern 2007) , adaptation is "crucial to deal with the unavoidable impacts of climate change to which the world is already committed". It has thus to be included in a comprehensive cost-benefit analysis of climate change policies. Adaptation encompasses a wide range of policy measures, such as building dikes that protect the landscape, developing vaccines to protect the population from diseases that spread as a consequence of climate change, improving general health conditions to increase the ability of coping with extreme weather conditions, changing urban architecture or building standards, reorganizing farming, and so on (Konrad and Thum 2014, p. 33 ).
This classification leaves aside one important aspect of adaptation: psychological adaptation to changing life circumstances. What is distinctive about psychologal adapation is that (on an individual level) it encompasses psychological reactions such as "appraisals of situations, affective responses, cognitive analysis and reframing, disengagement, defensive responses, and emotion regulation" (Reser and Swim 2011, p. 278) . Affective or hedonic adaptation mainly affects our emotional experiences and might be highly reactive toward shortterm changes. Emotions "function as an "online" monitoring system of people's progress toward their goals and strivings … but to retain its informational functionality, it must adapt quickly to long-term changes." (Luhmann et al 2012, p. 593) .
1 People adapt to some negative experiences completely, but adapation may neither be complete nor inevitable, may occur at different paces, and there may be considerable individual differences in the degree to which people adapt (see Frederick and Loewenstein 1999 , Diener, Lucas, and Scollon 2006 , Lucas 2007 , Lyubormirsky 2011 . Furthermore, although changing external circumstances will hardly have a long-lasting effect on the affective well-being, they may have long-lasting effects on the cognitive well-being. However, people may eventually also adapt cognitively if they find an explanation for the event (Wilson and Gilbert 2008) .
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In forecasting adaptive processes we do not do very well. According to Wilson and Gilbert (2003) , people can correctly anticipate the valence of future feelings and specific emotions (such as joy or sadness) but make systematic errors in predicting the intensity and durability of feelings. Riis et al. (2005) , for instance, show that healthy people fail to anticipate hedonic adaptation to poor health. So do Sackett and Torrance (1978) who find that healthy people evaluate one additional life year as a dialysis patient as being equivalent of living 0.39 additional years as a healthy person, while patients who actually suffer from dialysis evaluate one additional year of their current life as equivalent of living 0.56 additional healthy years. In an example, related to climate (change), Schkade and Kahneman (1998) asked people from Midwest and Southern California to rate their own life satisfaction and the life satisfaction of someone similar in the other region. It turned out that climate-related questions were more important for someone living in the other region than for someone living in the own region.
Apparently, climate is more important in evaluating some imaginary situation than in actual well-being. Such a 'focusing illusion' is paraphrased by Kahneman and Thaler (2006) 
The model
This section presents a simple model with stock pollution, where production today leads to environmental damage in the future, and where the consumers may either adapt or sensitize to the environmental damage through a habit-formation process. The three agent types are consumers, firms, and the government, which are characterized below.
Individuals and firms
Consider an overlapping generations (OLG) economy where each individual lives for two
periods. 
where super-scripts y and o refer to "young" and "old", respectively, and sub-script t to time period. In equation (1b), the dependence of utility on leisure has been suppressed, since the 3 Permanent noise exposure, for instance, may lead to sensitization (see Frederick and Loewenstein 1999). individual is assumed to be retired when old. The parameter α indicates the degree of adaptation or degree of sensitization to the environmental damage. We can think of (1a) and (1b) are analytically convenient by allowing us to abstract from environmental feedback effects and income effects; yet, neither additive separability nor quasilinearity is essential for the qualitative insights presented below. 4 We adopt Loewenstein, O'Donoghue and Rabin's (2003) idea of internal habit formation such that last period's stock of pollution serves as a reference measure with which the current stock is compared, 5 whereby we allow not only for adaptation but also for sensitization. To begin with, the degree of adaptation/sensitization is the same for everybody. We allow the parameter α to be in the interval
means full adaptation (or habituation) and 1 = − α means full sensitization, although most discussion below is based on the assumption that people adapt (such that (0, 1] α ∈ ) rather than become more sensitive to environmental damage. Of course, adaptation abilities may be quite different among people but we postpone the discussion about heterogeneity among individuals in terms of adaptation/sensitization to Section 4. Here, we stick to the simplified case of uniform adaptation behavior for the sake of the argument. Based on equations (1a) and (1b), the life-time utility function faced by an individual of generation t can then be written as
in which Θ indicates the utility discount factor, i.e., 1 / (1 )
where θ denotes the utility discount rate. The life-time budget constraint becomes 
where l denotes the hours of work, defined by a time endowment (normalized to one) less the time spent on leisure, i.e., 1 l z = − , while w denotes the before-tax wage rate, s savings and r the interest rate. The variable b is a lump-sum transfer paid to each young consumer, which equals the tax revenue raised through environmental taxation (see below). 6 An individual of generation t chooses t l and t s to maximize the life-time utility given by equation (2) subject to the life-time budget constraint presented in equations (3). Also, each individual is assumed to behave as an atomistic agent, treating factor prices, the lump-sum transfer and the stock of pollution as exogenous. The first order conditions for work hours and saving then become
, 1, 1 
The homogenous consumption good is produced by identical and competitive firms under constant returns to scale, and the number of such firms is normalized to one for notational convenience. The objective function of the representative firm in period t is written as ( )
where ( ) F ⋅ denotes the production function, k the capital stock, and t τ an output tax levied on the firm in period t. The firm then obeys the first order conditions
where ,
Accumulation of pollution
We assume that pollution is a state variable, which accumulates as follows:
The parameter δ represents physical depreciation of the stock of pollution, which in the case of greenhouse gases may be close to zero. As indicated above, the additions to the stock of pollution are assumed to be proportional to output, where the factor of proportionality t ρ is fixed within each period although it may vary over time. Such a setting encompasses special cases of switches from dirty ( 0 ρ > ) to clean ( 0 ρ = ) technologies as time passes.
The government
The government attempts to correct for the environmental damage in a way that maximizes a utilitarian social welfare function, which is given by the discounted sum of adjusted life-time utilities over generations
By assuming that the capital stock in period t equals the savings in period t−1, and then using equations (3) and (5a) together with the condition for government budget balance, i.e.,
, the resource constraint for the economy as a whole is given as follows:
meaning that output in any period is used for private consumption and net investment.
The resource allocation preferred by the government can be derived by choosing t c , t l , t x , t k and t e for all t to maximize the social welfare function given in equation (7) subject to the resource constraint and accumulation equation for the stock of pollution given by equation (8) and (6), respectively. The Lagrangean can then be written as
The Lagrange multipliers, γ and µ , are interpretable as present value shadow prices of physical capital and environmental quality (the negative of pollution), respectively. This will be discussed more thoroughly below. 
where we have used the short notation 1 t t t e e α − ∆ = − as defined above to denote the adaptationadjusted environmental damage, i.e., the measure of environmental pollution affecting individuals in period t. We start by deriving the policy rules for optimal output taxation in terms of the shadow price of pollution and then continue by analyzing this shadow price in more detail.
Optimal tax policy
We analyze the optimal environmental tax policy for any generation t. A marginal environmental tax on output can be derived by combining the first order conditions for the firm with the social first order condition for consumption and work hours attached to the young of generation t given in equations (10a) and (10b). We have derived the following result, which serves as a starting point for the analysis of corrective taxation.
Lemma 1. The optimal marginal output tax can be characterized as follows:
(1 )
Proof: see the Appendix.
The intuition behind Lemma 1 is straightforward. 
such that 0
Observation 1 means that without any adaptation or sensitization, the shadow price t µ becomes equal to the negative of the standard discounted sum of marginal utilities of pollution measured over all future generations, times the remaining part of this marginal unit of pollution (1 ) δ − in the periods following period t.
With adaptation or sensitization such that 0 α ≠ , Observation 1 is no longer valid in general. The shadow price of environmental quality is then given by 
In equation (15), , The second component in the square bracket on the right hand side of equation (15), i.e., the expression proportional to α , is due to the fact that increased pollution today affects the marginal utility of pollution in the future. With adaptation, i.e., (0, 1] α ∈ , this component works to reduce the shadow price of pollution and, therefore, most likely the optimal level of the corrective policy measure, whereas sensitization such that [ 1, 0) α ∈ − works the other way around. To see this more clearly, let us differentiate equation (15) with respect to α and evaluate the resulting derivative at 0 α = . As such, we are measuring how the shadow price of environmental quality reacts to a small increase in the degree of adaptation (or sensitization if we take the negative of this derivative) compared to the green benchmark case without any adaptation or sensitization. 
The multiplier (1 ) / (1 ) α θ θ − + + is interpretable as a weight that adaptation/sensitization gives to the marginal utility of pollution in the shadow price formula. Without any adaptation/sensitization (i.e., 0 α = ), this weight is equal to one. Therefore, adaptation decreases the weight given to the marginal utility of pollution below unity, whereas sensitization increases the weight above unity. Equation (16) 
Heterogeneity in the ability to adapt
So far we have focused on the case where all individuals have the same ability to adapt, i.e., α is the same for all individuals in each generation. Psychological research suggests that variables such as personality traits that predispose individuals to experience-specific life events explain heterogeneity in the ability to adapt (for further references, see Luhmann et al. 2012) . The results by Albouy et al. (2013) , who analyze U.S. households' preferences over local climates, show that preferences vary by location due to sorting or adaptation indicating the potential importance of heterogeneity in adaptation with respect to future climate change. We analyze this case by assuming that only a share of the population 0 1 ≤ ≤ β is able to adapt, i.e., 0 ≠ α , while the share 1− β is not able to adapt, i.e., 0 = α . If people face the same preferences but only differ in the degree of adaptation, the welfarist model with a utilitarian government will lead to a modified cost-benefit analysis compared to above. The social welfare function can then be written as
where super-script a refers to adapters and n to non-adapters. Also, to focus on heterogeneity with respect to adaptation, we assume that the individuals are identical in all other respects. The resource constraint and accumulation equation for environmental damage take the same form as above. Since we assume that individuals have the same preferences, and that the utility function is separable in the environmental damage, the social first order conditions for consumption and work hours do not differ between adapters and non-adapters. Therefore, the social first order conditions for t c , t l , 1 t x + and 1 t k + will remain as in equations (10a)- (10d), whereas the social first order condition for t e changes to read
(1 
With equation (19) at our disposal, the following result immediately follows from Lemma 1:
Proposition 3. If only a fraction β of the population adapts to the pollution, a welfarist government implements the first best through the following tax policy
(1 ) Proof: see the Appendix.
Proposition 3 implies that the formula for the externality correcting pollution tax becomes a linear combination of the formulas for adapters and non-adapters. For any given resource allocation (which means a given path for the stock of pollution), a higher share of adapters implies a lower optimal pollution tax for a utilitarian government that recognizes the assumed tendency to adapt among consumers. Lowering the pollution tax in response to adaptation makes the non-adapters worse off. 8 As long as at least some people adapt to the environmental damage, therefore, the application of the conventional tax formula in Observation 1 (which assumes away adaptation completely) typically leads to excessive taxation. Again, the interpretation in terms of sensitization is analogous: the standard tax formula in Observation 1 would in that case imply a too low tax.
Heterogeneity in the ability to psychologically adapt may also have severe implications for intergenerational redistribution, an issue thoroughly discussed by Stern (2007) in the context of technological adaptation. Early in the debate about climate change, Thomas Schelling (1992) suggested that highly developed, richer societies are less vulnerable to climate change as they have the financial and human capital, the knowledge and the appropriate technologies for an optimal reaction to climate change while poor societies lack the capability to cope. In so far as technological adaptation is positively correlated with psychological adaptation, this so-called 
Discussion
Climate policy hardly anticipates psychological adaptation or sensitization processes adaquately and thus cannot claim to provide reliable cost-benefit estimates for climate change. and social marginalization (Barnett and O'Neill 2012, p. 9) . These consequences can be alleviated by long-run adaptation policies that set incentives for people to migrate voluntarily.
This may both reduce the social and economic problems and increase the individuals' ability of psychological adaptation (Barnett and O'Neill 2012) . If people (and in particular the future generation) adapt to the new living conditions, this psychological adaptation, in addition to the technological adaption, can be expected to substantially reduce the ultimate cost of climate change.
Beyond its implication on intertemporal cost-benefit assessments of climate change, our analysis also has important and far-reaching normative implications. In standard welfare analysis, adaptation provides no justification for governments to intervene when individuals 9 Additionally, future environmental problems may also affect today's well-being via these psychological processes so that "climate change adaptation and mitigation are closely interlinked, in that it is one's psychological response to the climate change threat and one's changed thinking, feelings, motivations, and concerns that powerfully mediate the extent to which one engages in environmentally significant behavior" (Reser and Slim 2011, 285f) .
have rational expectations about their adaptation abilities (e.g., Aronsson and Schöb 2012) .
Furthermore, many economists discredit the idea of government intervention to correct for anticipation biases as paternalistic (Saint-Paul 2011 ). Yet, we have shown that in the presence of intertemporal externalities, psychological adaptation to environmental damage should play a crucial role in the design of an optimal policy. In the government's intertemporal decision problem, today's decision must be based on the best available information about both today's cost of mitigation and tomorrow's cost of coping with the consequences of today's decisions.
And these future consequences crucially depend on the future generations' ability to adapt, both technologically and psychologically. Psychological adaptation (as well as sensitization) must, therefore, be considered in a comprehensive cost-benefit analysis of a welfare-maximizing government. Thus, it is the denial of the importance of psychological adaptation processes that would make today's government paternalistic -by putting the future generation ahead of the current generation. 
Substituting into equation (13) gives equation (20). 
